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Brielle  Balance:  Does  It  Matter  If  I  Make  A  Difference? 
(Under  the  direction  of  Tom  Dougherty) 
 
 
I  address  the  collective  action  problem  of  animal  consumption:  It  is  all  of  our  individual 
acts  of  animal  product  consumption  which  drive  the  continued  existence  of  factory  farms,  yet  it 
is  also  true  that  no  single  person’s  actions  make  any  perceptible  difference  to  how  many  animals 
are  exploited.  So  what  are  we  to  say  of  each  individual’s  actions? 
The  question  has  traditionally  been  approached  by  examining  what  difference  our  actions 
of  consumption  make  to  the  harms  imposed  on  animals,  but  because  it  is  so  difficult  to 
satisfactorily  analyze  the  role  our  individual  actions  play  in  contributing  to  factory  farming, 
many  people  believe  we  do  not  have  good  enough  reason  to  change  our  consumption  habits. 
I  argue  that  those  who  believe  animal  cruelty  is  wrong  have  good  reason  to  refrain  from 
consuming  animal  products  regardless  of  how  we  want  to  analzye  the  external  effects  of 
individual  actions.  These  reasons  instead  have  to  do  with  integrity  and  our  responsibility  to  act  in 
ways  which  portray  a  genuineness  in  our  moral  judgments.  My  goal  is  to  sidestep  the  issues  the 
collective  action  problem  poses  for  pro-vegan  ideology  and  give  non-consequentialist-based 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
The  question  of  whether  or  not  it  is  ethical  to  consume  factory-farmed  animal  products  is 
not  a  new  one,  and  a  quick  scan  of  the  vast  amounts  of  literature  from  the  past  few  decades  tells 
us  the  question  has  already  been  approached  from  a  wide  range  of  angles.  Lots  of  the  discussion 
has  been  generated  from  a  puzzle  of  collective  action:  Factory  farms  exist  because  of  consumer 
demand.  If  no  one  bought  meat,  dairy,  and  egg  products,  factory  farms  would  not  exist  to 
propagate  animal  abuse.  Thus  it  is  precisely  our  acts  of  consumption  which  allow  and  encourage 
factory  farms  to  do  what  they  do.  But  a  single  person’s  act  out  of  many  millions  presumably  has 
at  best  a  negligible  effect,  if  any  at  all,  on  the  overall  demand  for  animal  products.  So  what  are 
we  to  say  of  each  individual’s  acts  of  consumption? 
  The  question  has  traditionally  been  approached  by  examining  what  difference  our 
actions  of  consumption  make  to  the  harms  imposed  on  animals.   In  defense  of  the  position  that  it 1
is  wrong  to  consume  animal  products  one  might  cite  the  indirect  contributions  to  the  sustenance 
of  factory  farms:  helping  to  continue  the  normalization  of  eating  meat,  dairy,  and  eggs  such  that 
it  is  socially  acceptable  to  dismiss  pro-vegan/vegetarian  arguments  without  much  thought.  One 
might  also  go  the  route  of  appealing  to  imperceptible  harms  and  insist  that  they  are  still  real 
harms  and  thus  morally  significant.  Both  of  these  approaches,  however,  have  been  met  with 
much  criticism.  Those  who  are  not  satisfied  with  such  arguments  even  go  so  far  as  to  say  that  the 
difficulties  posed  by  this  collective  action  problem  are  too  serious  to  overcome  for  those  who 




want  to  claim  that  it  is  morally  impermissible  to  consume  factory-farmed  animal  products.  2
Because  it  is  so  difficult  to  satisfactorily  analyze  the  role  our  individual  actions  play  in 
contributing  to  factory  farming,  they  say,  we  do  not  have  good  enough  reason  to  change  our 
consumption  habits. 
In  this  paper  I  want  to  defend  the  position  that  we  do  in  fact  have  good  reason  to  refrain 
from  consuming  factory-farmed  animal  products:  Doing  so  is  morally  wrong.  Rather  than 
arguing  for  this  claim  by  following  the  traditional  route  of  denying  the  assumption  that  our 
individual  acts  of  consumption  make  no  significant  difference  at  all,  I  instead  take  the  collective 
action  problem  seriously  and  grant  for  the  sake  of  argument  that  my  actions  alone  do  not  affect 
the  sustenance  or  downfall  of  factory  farms.  What  I  aim  to  show  in  this  paper  is  that  despite 
granting  that  refraining  from  consuming  animal  products  would  not  contribute  to  any  overall 
reduction  in  the  activities  of  factory  farms  (either  directly  or  indirectly),  in  most  cases  our  acts 
would  still  be  wrong.  I  defend  this  claim  by  way  of  two  separate  arguments. 
My  paper  will  proceed  as  follows:  I  will  first  present  an  argument  for  my  position  which 
rests  on  the  assumption  that  our  individual  actions  could ,  but  do  not,  make  a  difference.  I  draw 
from  work  by  Kagan   to  explore  how  this  might  be  so.  I  conclude  that  in  such  cases  we  are  not 3
significantly  different  from  agents  whose  actions  do  make  a  difference,  and  therefore  we  should 
regard  our  actions  in  a  similar  way  as  theirs.  That  is,  we  should  regard  actions  which  do  not 
make  a  difference  as  though  they  do.  If  actions  which  do  make  a  difference  are  wrong,  so  too  are 
the  actions  which  do  not.  For  reasons  which  will  become  clear  later  on,  I  call  this  the  Argument 
2  Budolfson,  Mark  Bryant,  2015,  “Is  it  wrong  to  eat  meat  from  factory  farms?  If  so,  why?”,  in  Bramble  and  Fischer 
(eds.)  2015:  80-90 
 




from  Moral  Luck .  I  then  move  to  a  stronger  argument  which  does  not  depend  on  even  the 
potential  for  our  actions  to  make  a  difference.  It  grants  the  most  extreme  possible  set  of 
conditions  agents  could  operate  under  the  collective  action  problem:  that  a  single  agent  cannot 
make  a  morally  significant  difference.  Nonetheless,  I  will  argue,  there  are  non-consequentialist 
reasons  we  have  to  refrain  from  consuming  animal  products  given  a  value  we  already  (ought  to) 
hold:  preventing  unnecessary  animal  cruelty.  At  the  core  of  this  argument  is  the  idea  that  we 
ought  to  act  in  accordance  with  our  values.  I  call  this  second  argument  for  my  position  the 
Argument  from  Integrity .  I  conclude  by  taking  stock  of  where  these  two  arguments  leave  us  with 
respect  to  morally  unproblematic  animal  product  consumption. 
 
2  METHODOLOGY 
How  might  we  explain  the  mechanics  behind  collective  action?  Kagan,  in  his  work  Do  I 
Make  a  Difference?,  explores  this  question  quite  thoroughly.  He  claims  there  are  two  imaginable 
basic  sorts  of  cases  that  give  rise  to  the  collective  action  problem: 
Imperceptible  Difference:  My  act  makes  a  real,  but  imperceptible,  difference  along 
some  dimension.  However,  even  though  small  enough  changes  along  this  dimension  are 
imperceptible,  enough  such  differences  can  add  up  to  a  sizeable  difference,  and  sizeable 
differences  can  be  perceived.  (117) 
 
Triggering:  Most  acts  make  no  difference,  but  some  single  act  makes  a  great  deal  of 
difference.  In  effect,  some  single  act  works  as  a  trigger  -  bringing  about  the  morally 
relevant  difference.  But  most  acts  make  no  difference  at  all.  (118) 
 
As  an  example  of  the  first  case,  we  can  think  about  adding  grains  of  sugar  to  water  to  affect  the 
taste;  one  more  or  less  grain  of  sugar  will  not  affect  how  sweet  the  water  tastes  to  us,  but  if 




overall  sweetness  of  the  water.  As  an  example  of  the  second  case,  Kagan  gives  the  example  of 
buying  chicken  from  the  supermarket: 
There  are,  perhaps,  25  chickens  in  a  given  crate  of  chickens.  So  the  butcher  looks  to  see 
when  25  chickens  have  been  sold,  so  as  to  order  25  more.  Here,  then,  it  makes  no 
difference  to  the  butcher  whether  7,  13,  or  23  chickens  have  been  sold.  But  when  25  have 
been  sold  this  triggers  the  call  to  the  chicken  farm,  and  25  more  chickens  are  killed,  and 
another  25  eggs  are  hatched  to  be  raised  and  tortured.  Thus...we  can  say  that  only  the 
25th  purchaser  of  a  chicken  makes  a  difference.  (122) 
 
Kagan  claims  that  all  collective  action  problems  (at  least  of  the  sorts  that  we  are  concerned 
about)  presumably  take  one,  the  other,  or  a  combination  of  both  forms. 
Kagan’s  purpose  in  carving  out  the  landscape  of  collective  action  problems  is  to  defend 
normative  consequentialism’s   ability  to  account  for  such  cases.  Assuming  that  Kagan  is  correct 4
about  these  categories  being  exhaustive,  if  he  can  show  that  normative  consequentialism  has  a 
way  of  addressing  each  kind  of  case,  then  he  has  shown  that  collective  action  cases  as  a  whole 
does  not  pose  a  problem  for  normative  consequentialism. 
By  contrast,  my  goal  in  outlining  this  landscape  is  not  to  defend  normative 
consequentialism,  but  rather  to  argue  for  the  view  that  it  is  wrong  to  consume  factory-farmed 
animal  products  even  if  our  actions  do  not  make  a  difference.  Nonetheless,  I  can  adapt  Kagan’s 
methodology  for  my  own  purposes:  If  I  can  show  for  each  kind  of  case  (imperceptible  difference 
and  triggering)  that  whether  or  not  our  individual  actions  make  a  difference  is  not  morally 
significant,  then,  given  that  the  consumption  of  animal  products  is  an  instance  of  a  collective 
action  problem,  I  will  have  shown  that  in  general  it  does  not  matter  whether  or  not  our  actions 
make  a  difference  to  the  goings-on  in  factory  farms.  Our  actions  are  still  wrong. 





While  I  find  Kagan’s  division  of  collective  action  cases  to  be  quite  plausible,  as  I  show 
later  on  in  my  paper,  the  force  of  my  latter  Argument  from  Integrity  does  not  rely  on  the 
assumption  that  Kagan  is  correct.  Borrowing  from  Kagan’s  approach,  however,  provides  a  clear 
and  structured  way  to  frame  my  own  thoughts.  
 
3  THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  MORAL  LUCK 
Assume  that  the  consumption  of  animal  products  works  via  triggering.  That  is,  only  every 
n th  action  matters.  For  those  of  us  whose  actions  are  not  counted  as  a  multiple  of  n ,  by  definition 
they  have  no  effect  on  the  amount  of  animal  abuse. 
What  is  the  difference  between  myself  (since  we  are  stipulating  for  the  purpose  of 
argument  that  my  actions  do  not  make  a  difference)  and  someone  who  carries  out  a  triggering 
act?  We  perform  exactly  the  same  action,  so  the  difference  will  not  be  found  in  anything  either  of 
us  does.  The  time  or  day  during  which  we  act  will  not  help  us  here  either  because  we  can  build  a 
triggering  scenario  under  which  it  does  not  matter  whether  one,  say,  is  the  first  customer  of  the 
morning  or  only  buys  on  Sundays.  The  only  difference  between  myself  and  someone  who  carries 
out  a  triggering  act  is  that  they,  and  not  I,  were  in  a  certain  position  in  a  queue  of  identical 
actions. 
What  affects  our  position  in  the  queue?  It  can  be  a  great  many  number  of  things:  the  time 
of  day  we  are  free  to  go  grocery  shopping,  the  time  of  day  others  are  free  to  go,  the  day  of  the 
week  we  do  our  shopping  on,  how  quickly  we  make  our  decision  at  the  grocery  store  relative  to 
others  who  are  also  looking  to  purchase  animal  products,  and  an  uncountable  number  of  other 




only  things  that  affect  whether  or  not  our  act  is  a  triggering  one,  are  morally  insignificant 
contingent  factors  -  a  majority  of  which  are  outside  our  control. 
Importantly,  though,  we  each  could  have  made  a  difference.  It  could  have  just  as  easily 
been  myself  who  was  the  n th  purchaser  of  an  animal  product,  triggering  a  tangible  chain  of 
events,  rather  than  someone  else.  And  what’s  more,  there  is  no  way  for  me  to  know  whether  or 
not  my  acts  of  consumption  are  going  to  make  a  difference.  I  cannot  take  steps  towards 
preventing  being  the  trigger.  I  would  not  have  had  to  act  any  differently;  it  could  have  been 
completely  up  to  someone  else’s  actions  that  my  own  was  the  n th  purchase.  (They  may  have 
decided  to  go  to  the  grocery  store  earlier  or  later,  for  example,  thus  changing  their  and  my 
position  in  the  queue.)  This  contingency  and  lack  of  control  are  the  keys  to  showing  that  it  does 
not  matter  morally  that  my  action  is  not  a  triggering  one. 
Recall  that  the  problem,  according  to  proponents  of  the  continued  consumption  from 
factory  farms,  is  that  it  is  difficult  to  justify  calling  for  a  cessation  of  the  consumption  of  animal 
products  on  the  grounds  of  reducing  the  negative  effects  of  factory  farms  given  that  each 
individual  who  does  so  will  not  make  any  difference  to  this  cause.  This  problem  does  not  exist 
for  individuals  whose  action  would  be  the  n th  one  (or  a  multiple  of  n )  and  act  as  a  trigger;  in 
these  instances  we  can  decisively  point  to  tangible  differences  which  take  place  in  factory  farms 
because  of  what  they,  as  an  individual,  do:  (possibly,)  another  x  animals  are  ordered  by  the 
supermarket,  the  butcher  slaughters  x  animals  as  a  result  of  that  order,  x  animals  are  bred  into 
existence  to  later  meet  the  same  fate,  etc.  Thus  we  can,  with  easy  justification,  say  to  individuals 




Since  the  triggering  agent  could  just  have  easily  been  me  -  even  without  changing 
anything  about  the  way  I  acted,  and  because  we  can  easily  point  to  a  reason  why  triggering 
agents  ought  not  act,  we  can  extrapolate  a  reason  for  myself,  as  a  non-triggering  agent,  not  to  act 
as  well.  It  is  only  a  matter  of  luck  that  I  do  not  make  a  difference,  and  that  in  itself  is  not  morally 
significant.  Therefore,  we  should  not  treat  the  outcomes  as  being  morally  different  either.  
3.1  Potential  Objections  and  Responses 
I  now  want  to  address  some  potential  objections  that  may  arise  in  response  to  my 
argument. 
Firstly,  the  objector  might  say,  why  do  we  end  up  with  the  positive  conclusion  instead  of 
the  negative  one?  That  is,  why  say  that  we  all  have  reason  to  refrain  from  consuming  animal 
products  rather  than  saying  that  no  one  does?  The  former  conclusion  is  drawn  on  the  basis  of 
there  being  no  morally  significant  difference  between  a  triggering  agent  and  a  non-triggering 
agent.  Couldn’t  this  basis  just  as  easily  lead  us  to  the  latter  conclusion? 
It  is  my  position  that,  while  either  the  negative  or  the  positive  conclusion  could  follow 
from  my  basis  in  theory ,  the  negative  one  is  in  fact  more  plausible.  There  are  two  initial  verdicts 
we  are  grappling  with  here:  A)  The  triggering  agent  acted  wrongly  and  B)  The  non-triggering 
agent  did  not  act  wrongly.  I  am  claiming  that  there  is  no  morally  significant  difference  between 
the  triggering  and  non-triggering  agent,  and  so  we  must  generalize  only  one  of  these  conclusions. 
[A]  rather  than  [B]  seems  like  the  more  plausible  candidate.  
One  justification  that  might  be  offered  is  the  following:  In  general,  for  situations  in  which 
our  actions  by  chance  may  or  may  not  result  in  harm,  but  that  harm  is  very  serious,  we  intuitively 




relatively  small.  The  consumption  of  animal  products  falls  perfectly  within  these  limits:  We  gain 
some  pleasure  from  the  animal-based  food  we  eat,  but  it  is  not  necessary  for  our  health  and  there 
are  arguably  other  plant-based  things  we  could  eat  that  would  bring  a  comparable  amount  of 
pleasure.  On  the  other  side,  however,  my  actions  could  potentially  trigger  a  tangible  amount  of 
extreme  animal  suffering  and  I  do  not  know  what  those  chances  are.  Being  willing  to  take  the 
risk  for  causing  great  harm  for  such  a  small  reward  is  itself  wrong.  Thus,  it  is  more  plausible  to 
say  that  the  triggering  agent  acted  wrongly  and  less  plausible  to  say  that  the  non-triggering  agent 
did  not  act  wrongly  given  the  cost/benefit  analysis.  So  we  should  generalize  [A]. 
The  objector  might  then  continue,  “All  of  this  talk  of  pleasure  and  cost/benefit  analysis 
sounds  very  consequentialist.  You  claim  to  be  using  only  Kagan’s  taxonomy  of  collective  action 
cases  to  frame  your  own  argument  grounded  in  moral  luck,  whereas  Kagan  approaches  the 
problem  from  a  normative  consequentialist  viewpoint.  But  your  argument  seems  to  bottom  out  to 
be  essentially  the  same  as  Kagan’s.  How  is  your  account  importantly  different?  What  unique  role 
does  moral  luck  really  play  in  this  argument?” 
Kagan’s  main  argument  against  acting  in  triggering-model  cases,  as  presented  in  Do  I 
Make  A  Difference?,  goes  as  follows:  Because  we  do  not  know  the  chances  that  our  action  will 
make  a  difference,  but  we  know  that  it  could  and  we  know  that  there  will  be  a  negative  net  result 
if  it  does.  Therefore,  we  ought  not  act.  (119-120) 
Admittedly,  Kagan’s  argument  is  very  similar  to  the  one  I  have  just  offered  above  for 
preferring  [A]  to  [B],  but  this  is  not  my  main  argument.  My  main  argument,  the  Argument  from 
Moral  Luck,  goes  as  follows:  1)  It  is  wrong  for  the  triggering  agent  to  eat  meat.  2)  There  is  no 




Therefore,  3)  it  is  also  wrong  for  the  non-triggering  agent  to  eat  meat.  Neither  of  these  two 
premises  necessarily  depend  on  consequentialist  reasoning.  The  argument  Kagan  and  I  offer  in 
this  section  of  the  paper  could  be  used  as  a  justification  of  premise  [1],  but  this  is  not  the  only 
way  to  secure  this  premise.  The  triggering  agent  could  be  wrong  because  they  are  violating  a 
duty  to  respect  non-human  life  and  not  cause  unnecessary  harm  to  animals.  It  may  even  just  be  a 
primitive  moral  fact  that  acting  in  such  a  way  is  wrong. 
In  summary,  my  argument  differs  from  a  standard  consequentialist  argument  like  Kagan’s 
in  that  they  are  simply  two  different  arguments.  And  while  consequentialist-like  reasoning  may 
be  used  to  justify  my  first  premise,  it  is  not  necessary.  There  are  other  things  we  can  appeal  to, 
such  as  the  violation  of  duties,  to  secure  the  proposition  that  the  triggering  agent  acted  wrongly. 
Thus  my  argument  is  consistent  with,  and  may  be  assisted  by,  consequentialist  reasoning,  but  it  is 
not  consequentialist  in  nature.  The  idea  of  moral  luck,  rather  than  some  consequentialist  calculus, 
lies  at  the  heart  of  my  argument.  It  is  the  idea  that  agents  who  arrive  at  different  outcomes  which 
depend  on  morally  insignificant  differences  ought  not  be  regarded  in  morally  different  ways 
which  allows  me  to  generalize  premise  [1]  to  arrive  at  my  conclusion. 
Thus  there  is  a  deeper  objection  one  might  raise  -  one  that,  unlike  the  previous  two,  aims 
directly  at  the  core  assumption  of  my  argument:  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  moral  luck.  Against 
premise  [2],  an  objector  might  claim  that  there  is  a  morally  significant  difference  between  the 
triggering  and  the  non-triggering  agent.  The  Problem  of  Moral  Luck  is  so-called  because, 
intuitively,  we  believe  that  there  are  differences  in  outcomes  which  are  caused  by  luck  or  chance 
yet  the  agents  do  merit  different  moral  appraisement.   Take  a  commonly  cited  example:  Two 5
5  See  Williams,  Bernard,  Moral  Luck  (1981):  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press  and  Nagel,  Thomas,  Mortal 





drivers  drive  home  drunk  in  their  cars.  One  driver  makes  it  home  safely  with  no  incident.  The 
other  hits  and  injures  a  pedestrian.  Though  they  both  did  something  wrong,  we  intuitively  believe 
that  the  driver  who  hit  the  pedestrian  did  something  more  wrong,  as  evidenced  by  the  law’s 
different  treatment  of  such  cases.  Merely  driving  under  the  influence  carries  a  lesser  sentence 
than  vehicular  manslaughter .  Another  example  in  favor  of  the  existence  of  moral  luck  involves 6
two  firefighters  who  run  into  a  burning  building  looking  for  people  trapped  inside.  As  a  stroke  of 
luck,  one  firefighter  finds  someone  to  save  and  the  other  does  not.  After  the  fiasco,  the  firefighter 
who  succeeded  in  saving  someone  gets  more  praise  than  the  firefighter  who  did  not.  Thus,  the 
objector  might  say,  premise  [2]  is  false,  or  at  the  very  least  can  be  plausibly  denied. 
I  want  to  begin  my  response  by  stating  that  solving  the  Problem  of  Moral  Luck  is  outside 
the  scope  of  this  paper,  but  I  do  think  that  it  is  possible  to  respond  to  the  objection  in  this  case . 
That  is,  even  if  I  cannot  show  that  moral  luck  does  not  exist  in  all  cases,  I  can  show  that  it  should 
not  exist  in  this  one.  In  both  the  drunk  driver  and  firefighter  cases,  we  know  which  agent  made 
the  difference  and  so  are  able  to  treat  them  differently.  In  the  case  of  triggering  events  related  to 
factory  farming,  though,  this  is  not  the  case.  All  we  know  is  that  some  agents  trigger  a  difference 
and  others  do  not,  but  we  do  not  know  who  is  who.  We  are  simply  not  in  the  proper  epistemic 
position  to  do  anything  with  the  knowledge  that  luck  determines  the  outcome  of  our  action 
except  disregard  it  in  our  moral  analysis. 
3.2  Taking  Stock 
I  have  just  defended  the  idea  that,  if  factory  farms  operate  on  a  triggering  model,  then  it 
does  not  make  sense  to  insist  that  we  have  no  reason  not  to  consume  factory-farmed  animal 




products  if  our  actions  do  not  make  a  difference.  We  have  reasons  not  to  consume  animal 
products  under  the  assumption  that  our  actions  will  make  a  difference  (i.e.,  they  trigger  a  bad 
chain  of  events),  and  those  reasons  apply  just  as  well  to  non-trigger  agents. 
So,  where  does  this  leave  the  defender  of  veganism?  They  can  say  that  we  have  reasons 
not  to  consume  animal  products  even  if  doing  so  does  not  make  a  difference  with  two  caveats: 
First,  operations  in  factory  farms  must  depend  on  a  triggering  case-type  scenario.  Second,  it  must 
also  be  the  case  that  each  of  our  actions  has  the  potential  to  make  a  difference.  In  cases  where 
one  or  both  of  these  caveats  is  not  met,  I  do  not  at  this  point  have  anything  to  say  in  defense  of 
refraining  from  consuming  factory-farmed  animal  products. 
My  Argument  from  Moral  Luck  does  not  apply  if  operations  in  factory  farms  depended 
on  an  imperceptible  difference  model.  There  is  no  individual  act  which  triggers  some  tangible 
bad  result.  Instead,  no  action  functions  as  a  trigger  and  by  definition  no  (typical)  agent  on  their 
own  has  even  the  potential  to  make  any  perceptible  difference. 
Furthermore,  even  if  we  grant  that  factory  farms  work  on  the  triggering  model,  one  would 
not  have  a  reason  to  refrain  from  consuming  animal  products  if  they  could  be  reasonably  sure 
that  their  actions  do  not  even  have  the  potential  to  make  a  difference.  That  is,  if  we  were  in  the 
proper  epistemic  position  to  know  that  we  would  not  be  the  trigger.  Imagine,  to  borrow  another 
example  from  Kagan: 
The  New  Haven  Friends  of  Chicken  Consumption  phone  me  up,  proving  to  me  that  they 
have  reliable  information  about  the  relevant  triggering  number  at  my  local  supermarket, 
and  precise  information  about  the  number  of  chicken  purchases  that  are  going  to  be  made 
today.  Suppose  I  know  for  a  fact  that  increased  orders  are  triggered  at  multiples  of  25, 
and  that  other  than  me  there  will  be  exactly  66  chickens  purchased  today.  If  I  buy  a 
chicken  as  well,  then  the  total  number  of  purchases  will  be  precisely  67...In  such  a  case  I 
know  that  my  act  makes  no  difference,  and  results  will  not  be  any  better  if  I  refrain  from 





Of  course,  this  is  quite  far-fetched,  but  that  does  not  mean  there  cannot  be  more  plausible  cases 
in  which  we  can  know  that  our  actions  will  not  make  a  difference:  Suppose  I  am  part  of  the 
clean-up  crew  for  a  catered  event  which  served  animal  products.  My  job  is  to  handle  the 
leftovers.  I  can  do  this  in  at  least  two  ways:  by  throwing  them  in  the  trash  or  by  taking  them 
home  for  myself  to  eat  later.  I  take  the  leftover  catering  home  and  have  it  for  dinner.  This  is  also 
a  case  of  consuming  animal  products,  but  here  I  can  be  sure  that  my  actions  do  not  have  a  chance 
of  triggering  a  bad  chain  of  events.  That  was  up  to  the  organizers  of  the  event.  The  damage,  if 
there  was  any,  has  already  been  done. 
So  my  argument  thus  that  we  have  reason  to  refrain  from  consuming  animal  products 
even  if  doing  so  does  not  make  a  difference  clearly  has  some  limitations  as  it  currently  stands.  It 
only  works  under  two  assumptions:  first,  that  factory  farming  operates  under  a  triggering  model, 
and  second,  that  my  action  has  the  potential  to  make  a  morally  relevant  difference  -  either  or  both 
of  which  could  plausibly  be  false.  My  second  argument,  the  Argument  from  Integrity,  is  meant  to 
fill  these  holes. 
 
4  THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  INTEGRITY 
Let  us  now  work  under  the  assumption  that  factory  farming  operates  under  an 
imperceptible  difference  model.  According  to  Kagan,  this  means  that,  unlike  under  the  trigger 
model,  each  individual  act  does  make  a  difference.  However,  because  this  difference  is 
imperceptible,  the  difference  is  not  morally  relevant  in  that  the  results  would  not  be  better  had 
one  acted  differently.  (117)  From  this,  we  can  say  that  if  factory  farming  works  under  the 




relevant  difference.  Thus,  if  I  am  able  to  show  that  we  have  reason  to  refrain  from  consuming 
animal  products  under  this  model  of  factory  farming,  then  I  will  have  bypassed  both  caveats  of 
the  above  argument. 
4.1  An  Aside  On  Kagan’s  Taxonomy 
Now  as  I  stated  in  the  beginning  of  my  paper,  my  strategy  is  to  use  Kagan’s  taxonomy  of 
collective  action  cases  to  argue  that,  no  matter  what  model  of  collective  action  factory  farms 
operate  under,  we  would  have  reason  to  refrain  from  consuming  factory-farmed  animal  products 
whether  or  not  we  make  a  difference.  This  is,  of  course,  working  under  the  assumption  that 
Kagan’s  division  of  cases  is  both  correct  and  exhaustive.  However,  there  are  objections  one 
might  raise  to  Kagan’s  taxonomy.  I  will  discuss  them  here  briefly  for  the  purposes  of  detailing 
why  the  force  of  my  Argument  from  Integrity  does  not  depend  on  Kagan  being  correct. 
One  may  take  issue  with  Kagan’s  assumption  that  “what  matters  morally  is  making  a 
difference  to  perception.”  (117)  They  might  insist  that  there  is  more  to  mattering  morally  than 
making  a  perceptible  difference.  Indeed  this  is  something  that,  due  to  my  project,  I  must  insist 
upon.  The  idea  that  imperceptible  differences  can  be  morally  relevant  may  at  first  seem  like  an 
issue  because  part  of  my  reason  for  advancing  this  second  argument  is  to  bypass  one  of  the 
caveats  of  the  Argument  from  Moral  Luck:  that  my  action  has  the  potential  to  make  a  morally 
relevant  difference.  And,  though  I  cannot  imagine  how  the  situation  might  go  otherwise,  one 
may  take  issue  with  Kagan’s  taxonomy  itself.  It  is  possible  there  is  another  way  that  collective 
action  cases  work,  aside  from  triggering  or  by  aggregated  imperceptible  differences,  that  we  have 




In  any  case,  I  can  put  both  of  these  objections  to  rest  by  simply  granting  the  difference  an 
individual  makes  in  their  consumption  of  factory  farmed  is  itself  not  morally  significant.  This 
nicely  accommodates  the  spirit  of  Kagan’s  assumption  without  going  so  far  as  to  rule  out  the 
possibility  that  there  are  other  ways  our  imperceptibly  consequential  actions  could  possess  moral 
significance.  This  also  takes  care  of  the  second  objection  because  I  leave  open  the  kind  of 
difference  one  makes  -  it  could  be  a  triggering  difference,  or  an  imperceptible  one,  or  a  different 
one  entirely.  I  take  this  to  be  the  most  generous  possible  granting  of  assumptions  without 
immediately  begging  the  question  against  my  argument.  Thus,  if  one  is  not  completely 
convinced  by  Kagan’s  taxonomy  of  collective  action  cases,  they  can  simply  proceed  under  the 
proposition  that  I  have  granted :  whatever  difference  an  individual  makes  is  not  itself  morally 7
significant.  And,  of  course,  my  Argument  from  Integrity  also  works  if  Kagan  is  correct.  
4.2  The  Argument  from  Integrity  (cont.) 
My  argument  will  be  based  on  the  importance  of  and  conditions  for  having  integrity. 
Given  that  the  external  impacts  of  our  actions  are  not  importantly  relevant  considerations  under 
the  imperceptible  difference  model,  it  makes  sense  that  my  focus  here  is  something  more 
internal,  having  to  do  more  with  the  character  we  possess  rather  than  our  impact  on  the  world. 
(Of  course,  our  characters  usually  influence  the  ways  in  which  we  impact  the  world,  but  the  latter 
is  by  no  means  a  function  of  the  former.)  I  will  argue  that  consuming  factory-farmed  animal 
products  shows,  in  the  vast  majority  of  people,  a  lack  of  integrity.  To  understand  why  I  take  this 
7  Interestingly,  Kagan  himself  takes  issue  with  imperceptible  difference  cases.  While  in  theory  they  seem  to  make 
sense,  he  claims  to  have  proven  them  impossible  in  actuality.  However,  his  argument  for  this  claim  appeals  to 
paradoxical  notions,  and  so  may  not  be  completely  satisfying  to  some.  My  aim  in  addressing  this  has  been  to  make 




to  be  the  case,  it  will  first  be  useful  for  me  to  lay  out  the  conception  of  integrity  I  am  working 
under  here.  I  adopt  Calhoun’s  work   on  this  front. 8
Calhoun,  in  her  work  Standing  for  Something ,  makes  the  convincing  argument  that  “the 
notion  of  standing  for  something  is  central  to  the  meaning  of  integrity.”  (253)  To  have  integrity  is 
to  value  something  and  stand  for  it  in  such  a  way  that  our  actions  communicate  to  others  that  we 
are  worth  taking  seriously.  People  with  integrity  stand  by  their  endorsements  because  they 
believe  those  endorsements  ought  to  matter  to  others.  This  is  why  we  say  that  people  who  lack 
the  courage  of  their  convictions  do  not  have  integrity;  they  do  not  seem  to  believe  they  deserve 
to  be  taken  seriously.  This  is  also  why  we  say  that  people  who  are  hypocrites  do  not  have 
integrity;  they  misrepresent  what  they  value  and  mislead  us  about  what  they  think  we  should  care 
about.  In  short,  to  have  integrity  is  to  take  our  judgments  seriously  because  we  want  to  show 
others  that  they  ought  to  take  them  seriously  as  well. 
We  value  integrity  because  we  think  that  honest  and  genuine  participation  in  the  moral 
community  is  important.  As  Calhoun  rightly  points  out,  our  own  judgments  about  what  is  worth 
doing  may  be  mistaken.  We  know  this,  and  look  to  others  to  help  us  get  it  right.  (257-58)  We 
recognize  that  others  are  in  the  same  position  as  we  are  -  that  is  they  seek  others’  opinions  about 
what  is  valuable  to  help  form  their  own.  A  person  with  integrity  understands  the  important  role 
they  have  the  potential  to  play  in  their  moral  community  and  takes  it  seriously.  They  show  us  that 
we  ought  to  trust  them  -  that  we  ought  to  give  weight  to  what  they  think.  A  person  who  lacks 
integrity,  then,  is  one  who,  despite  being  a  member  of  the  moral  community,  does  not  act  like  it. 
They  do  not  take  this  role  seriously  and  they  do  not  care  that  others  may  be  looking  to  them  for 




help  in  deliberation  and  in  deciding  what  it  worth  doing.  We  benefit  from  the  moral  community 
we  are  a  part  of  because  they  help  us  when  we  are  unsure  about  our  judgments.  To  not  return  the 
favor  would  be  unfair  and  inconsiderate.  We  have  a  responsibility  to  our  fellow  agents  to  behave 
with  integrity.  
So  how  does  consuming  animal  products  signal  a  lack  of  integrity?  To  answer  this,  we 
must  first  determine  the  relevant  judgment  that  one  is  failing  to  stand  for.  The  most  immediately 
relevant  topic  here  concerns  the  treatment  of  animals.  Most  people  -  even  those  who  consume 
factory-farmed  animal  products  -  will  say  that  they  are  against  unnecessary  animal  cruelty.  I  take 
“unnecessary”  to  mean  something  like  “could  do  without  and  still  maintain  a  good  quality  of 
life”,  for  example,  dog  fighting  and  the  use  of  wild  animals  in  circuses.  Both  practices  involve 
causing  harm  to  the  animals,  and  while  they  could  in  theory  enrich  one’s  life  by  bringing  a 
source  of  entertainment,  one  could  certainly  live  a  fulfilling  life  without  them. 
Now  that  we  have  identified  the  relevant  judgment,  that  unnecessary  animal  cruelty  is 
wrong,  we  can  now  move  to  discussing  what  it  means  to  “stand  for”  it.  The  notion  of  standing 
for  is  left  vague  by  Calhoun,  but  given  that  we  have  a  good  intuitive  understanding  of  integrity  it 
should  not  be  difficult  to  provide  a  general  account  of  what  the  notion  includes.  To  “stand  for” 
your  belief  that  unnecessary  animal  cruelty  is  wrong  is  to  act  in  such  a  way  that  shows  your 
disapproval  is  to  be  taken  seriously  by  others.  In  the  case  of  dog  fighting  and  wild  animal 
circuses,  this  means  refusing  to  participate  in  dog  fights  (e.g.  by  placing  bets)  and  not  supporting 
circuses  which  use  wild  animals  (e.g.  by  refusing  to  buy  tickets  to  their  shows).  By  distancing 
ourselves  from  the  things  we  claim  to  find  morally  wrong,  we  communicate  to  others  that  we 




precisely  what  it  means  to  “stand  for”  something  in  the  next  section  of  my  paper,  but  I  take 
myself  to  have  established  at  least  a  workable  notion  at  this  point.  For  the  sake  of  flow  and  ease 
of  understanding,  I  will  address  “standing  for”  more  completely  later  on  and  continue  with  the 
Argument  from  Integrity  here.) 
With  a  general  understanding  of  what  it  means  to  “stand  for”  unnecessary  animal  cruelty, 
the  question  now  becomes:  Is  factory  farming  an  unnecessary  form  of  animal  cruelty?  It  is. 
Firstly,  factory  farms  only  exist  because  of  the  massive  demand  for  animal  products.  Factory 
farms  provide  us  with  what  is  currently  the  only  way  to  meet  this  demand.  But  many  people  who 
consume  animals  -  enough  people  that  it  would  make  a  difference  to  how  animal  products  could 
be  produced  -  do  not  need  to.  Their  quality  of  life  would  not  significantly  decrease  with  the 
elimination  of  animal  products  from  their  diet.  So  one  sense  in  which  factory  farming  counts  as 
unnecessary  animal  cruelty  is  that  they  only  exist  because  of  unneccessary  demand.  Secondly, 
factory  farms  do  not  always  -  indeed  they  rarely  do  -  employ  painless  killing  methods,  despite 
having  the  tools  to  do  so.  Lastly  (but  not  exhaustively),  many  factory  farm  workers  suffer 
psychological  distress  and  severe  cognitive  dissonance  from  the  work  they  have  to  do,  and,  as  a 
coping  mechanism,  go  out  of  their  way  to  treat  livestock  cruelly  (e.g.  kicking  them  around  or 
butchering  them  while  conscious).  Thus  the  other  sense  in  which  factory  farming  counts  as 
unnecessary  animal  cruelty  is,  quite  simply,  that  animals  are  treated  unnecessarily  cruelly  within 
them.  So  if  we  judge  that  unnecessary  animal  cruelty  is  wrong,  and  factory  farming  is 
unnecessary  animal  cruelty,  we  also  judge  that  factory  farming  is  wrong. 
We  “stand  for”  this  judgment  the  same  way  we  would  stand  against  animal  cruelty  in  the 




from  consuming  animal  products  produced  in  factory  farms,  we  communicate  to  others  that  we 
are  taking  this  judgment  seriously.  To  hold  the  judgment  that  factory  farming  is  wrong  and  yet 
continue  to  eat  factory-farmed  animal  products  sends  the  message  to  others  that  this  judgment  is 
not  one  we  are  willing  to  back  with  our  actions.  We  would  be  saying  one  thing  and  doing 
another,  thus  failing  to  play  our  role  as  a  member  of  the  moral  community  with  integrity.  
My  goal  in  this  section  of  the  paper  has  been  to  provide  a  very  general  explanation  of 
how  it  is  that  our  consumption  of  animal  products  indicates  a  lack  of  integrity  with  respect  to  the 
near-universal  judgement  that  unnecessary  animal  cruelty  is  wrong.  However,  this  has  only  been 
a  broad  presentation  of  my  argument  so  as  to  get  the  general  idea  across.  As  promised,  in  the 
next  section  of  this  paper  I  respond  to  some  potential  objections  to  this  argument  as  it  stands  and, 
in  the  process,  take  this  chance  to  address  some  important  nuances  in  and  implications  of  my 
claims.  
4.2  Potential  Objections  and  Responses 
The  most  obvious  objection  I  expect  one  to  raise  would  be  to  ask  why  we  cannot  “stand 
for”  being  against  factory  farming  in  a  different  way?  Instead  of  refraining  from  consuming 
factory-farmed  animal  products,  why  can’t  we  instead  call  upon  the  government  to  enact  changes 
in  animal  agricultural  laws ,  and  in  this  way  show  that  we  take  our  judgments  seriously  (and 9
expect  others  to  as  well)?  Why  is  refraining  from  consumption  the  only  right  course  of  action  to 
take? 
Responding  to  this  objection  will  require  precisfying  the  notion  of  “standing  for” 
something  one  is  against.  Thus  far  I  have  used  words  like  “distancing”,  “disassociating”,  and 
9  This  alternative  suggested  in  MacLean,  Douglas,  “Climate  Complicity  and  Individual  Accountability”,  The  Monist 




“separating”  to  provide  the  reader  with  a  general  conception  of  what  I  mean,  but  I  will  now 
commence  with  an  extended  discussion  to  fill  in  the  gaps  that  Calhoun  has  left. 
The  conditions  under  which  one  can  be  said  to  properly  “stand  for”  something  differ 
depending  on  the  context.  Not  all  situations  require  the  same  general  kind  of  action  or  behavior. 
In  some  cases,  calling  upon  some  governing  body  without  changing  any  of  your  other  actions  or 
behaviors  is  sufficient.  In  other  cases,  it  is  not.  (There  are,  of  course,  other  ways  to  properly 
stand  for  a  value  which  exclude  any  sort  of  government  altogether.  I  only  stick  to  this  example 
here  as  it  is  the  relevant  one  raised  by  MacLean.  Keeping  specifically  to  political(esque)  activism 
allows  me  to  explore  the  notion  of  “standing  for”  in  a  focused  way.)  As  an  example  of  the 
former,  if  I  wanted  to  stand  for  raising  the  minimum  wage  to  a  livable  wage,  voting  on  a 
proposition  to  increase  it  would  be  enough.  As  an  example  of  the  latter,  take  a  fraternity  member 
who  thinks  himself  to  stand  for  feminist  values  he  was  part  of  a  sit-in  aimed  at  pressuring  the 
dean  to  take  a  female  student’s  sexual  assault  allegations  seriously,  yet  laughs  along  with  his 
fraternity  brothers  whenever  one  of  them  makes  a  sexist  joke. 
The  difference  between  these  two  cases,  I  submit,  is  that  in  the  former,  there  is  nothing 
anyone  could  point  to  in  my  actions  which  shows  I  am  not  taking  my  judgment  seriously.  This  is 
not  true  in  the  latter  case.  As  a  self-proclaimed  feminist,  the  fraternity  member  should  have 
spoken  out  against  the  sexist  behavior  of  his  friends.  To  further  test  this  idea,  let  us  slightly 
modify  the  living  wage  case:  Say  that  it  is  now  Jeff  Bezos  instead  of  myself  who  wants  to  “stand 
for”  raising  the  minimum  wage.  If  all  he  does  is  vote  on  the  proposition,  and  nothing  else,  no  one 
would  think  he  has  shown  that  he  takes  having  a  livable  wage  seriously.  This  is  because,  as  the 




ends  meet,  there  is  something  we  can  point  to  which  highlights  a  significant  discrepancy  between 
actions  and  supposed  values.   10
But  is  the  idea  of  “having  something  to  point  to”  enough?  One  might  question  my 
assertion  that  there  is  nothing  out  there  which  would  merit  the  belief  that  I  am  not  taking  my 
judgment  seriously.  For  example,  I  perhaps  could  have  attended  a  workers’  march  in  my  area  or 
taken  the  time  to  campaign  in  support  of  the  proposition  to  raise  minimum  wage.  If  these  were 
possibilities  open  to  me  and  I  did  not  take  them,  the  objector  might  push,  how  can  I  say  that  I  am 
truly  taking  my  judgment  seriously? 
I  suggest  that  such  actions  are  better  thought  of  as  being  above  and  beyond ,  rather  than 
being  necessary ,  for  properly  “standing  for”  the  value.  The  difference  between  actions  (or 
purposeful  inactions)  which  are  necessary  and  actions  which  go  above  and  beyond  has  to  do  with 
how  they  relate  to  bringing  about  or  upholding  the  value  in  question:  Voting  for  a  proposition  to 
increase  minimum  wage  straightforwardly  contributes  to  everyone  making  a  liveable  wage, 
whereas  marches  and  campaigning  merely  bring  awareness  to  this  cause.   We  should  also  think 11
of  whether  or  not  some  action  undermines  the  bringing  about  or  upholding  of  the  value.  In  the 
case  of  the  self-proclaimed  feminist  fraternity  member,  his  refusal  to  speak  out  against  his 
brothers’  sexist  jokes  allows  anti-feminist  attitudes  to  persist.  
10  In  response  to  mounting  pressure,  Bezos  raised  the  minimum  wage  of  his  workers  to  $15  an  hour  in  2018  and  has 
stated  that  his  company  will  now  lobby  to  raise  minimum  wage  federally.  Imagine  a  pre-2018  Bezos  being  used  in 
this  example,  or  whichever  CEO  fits  the  bill  of  failing  to  provide  a  livable  wage.  There  are  many  to  choose  from. 
 
11  It  makes  more  sense  to  think  of  actions  which  go  above  and  beyond  as  indicators  for  how  important  some  value  is 
to  an  individual,  or  how  close  to  their  heart  they  hold  it,  rather  than  as  an  indicator  of  whether  or  not  they  are  taking 
their  judgments  seriously:  If  we  are  willing  to  act  even  in  ways  which  do  not  have  a  straightforward  connection  to 




From  all  this,  we  can  conclude  that  in  order  to  properly  “stand  for”  a  judgment  or  value 
we  hold,  there  must  be  no  discrepancy  between  our  actions  and  that  value,  where  a  discrepancy 
is  either  failing  to  act  in  such  a  way  that  straightforwardly  contributes  to  the  bringing  about  or 
upholding  of  that  value,  or  acting  in  such  a  way  that  undermines  the  bringing  about  or  upholding 
of  that  value. 
With  this  more  precise  understanding  of  what  it  means  to  “stand  for”  a  judgment,  we 
finally  have  the  means  to  respond  to  the  first  objection:  The  reason  we  must  refrain  from 
consuming  factory-farmed  meat  in  order  to  properly  stand  for  the  judgment  that  factory  farming 
is  wrong  is  because  this  straightforwardly  contributes  to  the  upholding  of  this  value;  it  is  our  very 
acts  of  consumption  which  ultimately  keep  factory  farms  in  business.  Furthermore,  our  refusal  to 
refrain  from  consumption  undermines  this  value  for  the  very  same  reason.  So  this  is  a  necessary 
action  we  need  to  carry  out  in  order  to  show  that  we  take  our  judgments  seriously,  that  is,  that  we 
have  integrity.  Petitioning  the  government  to  enact  laws,  on  the  other  hand,  is  better  thought  of  as 
something  above  and  beyond  what  we  must  do. 
The  second  objection  one  might  raise  is  that  my  argument  is  too  demanding;  the 
conditions  for  having  integrity  are  too  high.  My  argument  implies  that  if  we  judge  that  we  take 
environmental  stewardship  to  be  important,  then  we  ought  to  stop  doing  things  like  driving  cars, 
taking  international  flights  for  leisure,  and  possibly  even  refrain  from  reproducing  (as,  the 
argument  goes,  creating  a  human  who  will  then  go  on  to  also  produce  a  lifetime  of  waste  is 
perhaps  one  of  the  singularly  most  damaging  things  we  could  do  to  the  environment).  Many  of 
us  hold  the  value  of  environmental  stewardship,  yet  we  do  not  want  to  say  that  people  who  drive, 




I  think  this  objection  is  oversimplified.  If  we  do  hold  values  like  this,  they  are  qualified 
values.  Similar  to  one’s  being  opposed  to  unnecessary  animal  cruelty  (“unnecessary”  in  being 
defined  as  something  along  the  lines  of  “could  do  without  and  still  maintain  a  good  quality  of 
life”),  I  suspect  a  more  accurate  value  at  play  when  it  comes  to  environmental  conservation  has  a 
similar  caveat.  Our  quality  of  life  would  be  significantly  impacted  if  we  banned  ourselves  from 
using  our  cars,  flying  to  experience  other  cultures  and  lands,  and  reproducing.  Once  we  get  clear 
about  the  qualifications  we  place  on  the  general  values  we  hold,  it  becomes  clear  that  my 
argument  is  not  as  demanding  as  one  may  initially  worry. 
At  this  point  someone  might  insist,  “But  what  of  individuals  who  do  not  believe  that 
unnecessary  animal  suffering  is  wrong?”  In  such  cases  I  would  simply  admit  that  a  person  who 
does  not  hold  these  values  and  consumes  animal  products  would  not  be  acting  in  a  way  which 
highlights  a  lack  of  integrity,  but  to  not  hold  these  values  in  the  first  place  is  morally  problematic 
all  on  its  own. 
4.3  Taking  Stock 
So,  if  one  is  against  unnecessary  animal  cruelty,  then  they  ought  also  to  be  against  factory 
farming.  To  have  integrity  with  respect  to  this  value,  they  must,  except  in  the  cases  I  outline 
below,  refrain  from  consuming  factory-farmed  animal  products.  
This  does  not  include  buying  animal  products  from  small-scale  farms  who  genuinely  give 
their  animals  a  good  life  and  a  painless  death,  but  this  is  not  universalizable  because  the  demand 
for  animal  products  is  too  great  for  all  of  the  developed  world  to  get  their 
meat/seafood/eggs/dairy  from  small-scale  farms.  Thus  this  exclusion  will  only  apply  to  a  small 




necessarily  equate  to  cruelty  free  -  these  terms  are  used  more  to  appeal  to  the  consumer  rather 
than  guarantee  a  good  quality  of  life  for  the  livestock.  Aside  from  it  being  impossible  for 
everyone  to  buy  from  morally  unproblematic  farmers,  it  will  also  be  very  difficult  to  be  sure  of 
such  conditions  in  the  first  place.  So  even  though  my  arguments  allow  for  these  exceptions,  it 
does  not  prevent  me  from  saying  that  in  general  we  have  good  reason  to  refrain  from  consuming 
animal  products. 
This  argument  also  does  not  apply  to  those  with  dietary  restrictions  or  health  concerns 
that  prevent  them  from  adopting  a  plant-based  diet,  nor  does  it  apply  to  those  without  the 
financial  means  or  time  to  make  the  switch.  In  general,  this  argument  does  not  apply  to  people 
who  would  have  a  more-difficult-than-average  time  eliminating  animal  products  from  their  diet. 
To  list  some  examples,  a  child  who  still  lives  with  their  parents,  a  person  living  in  a  small,  or 
members  of  a  rural  town  whose  grocery  stores  do  not  carry  as  much  variety.  For  this  minority  of 
people,  it  would  be  necessary  for  them  to  consume  animal  products.  They  would  not  be  able  to 
maintain  a  good  quality  of  life  without  doing  so.  In  such  cases,  we  might  instead  hope  to  see 
them  take  up  different  courses  of  action  which  align  with  their  values,  though  less  directly. 
 
5  CONCLUSION 
In  this  paper  I  have  tried  to  defend  the  idea  that  we  have  reason  to  refrain  from 
consuming  factory-farmed  animal  products  despite  our  individual  actions  not  making  any 
difference  to  the  amount  of  animal  suffering  caused  by  factory  farms.  I  cite  this  as  a  collective 
action  problem  and  adopt  the  same  strategy  that  Kagan  did  in  his  2011  paper  Do  I  Make  a 




conclusion  follows  from  each  kind,  to  show  that  this  conclusion  follows  from  the  situation  as  a 
whole.  (My  argument,  however,  does  not  depend  on  Kagan’s  taxonomy  being  correct.) 
The  first  kind  of  collective  action  cases  are  triggering  cases,  and  I  argued  that  in  such 
cases  our  actions  (which  by  stipulation  do  not  make  a  difference)  are  not  importantly  different 
from  another’s  actions  (which  do  make  a  difference).  Since  we  had  reason  in  the  latter  case  to 
say  they  are  wrong,  I  argued,  we  also  had  reason  in  the  former  case  to  say  the  same.  I  called  this 
the  Argument  from  Moral  Luck. 
Collective  action  cases  may  also  take  a  non-trigger  form  (perhaps  operating  by 
imperceptible  difference,  but  perhaps  not)  which  for  some  reason  or  other  do  not  themselves 
make  any  morally  relevant  difference,  and  in  such  cases  I  argued  that  our  reasons  for  refraining 
from  consuming  animal  products  had  to  do  with  integrity.  Integrity  is  an  important  virtue  and  it 
lacking  it  signifies  a  moral  defect  in  our  character.  Thinking  that  it  is  wrong  for  animals  to  suffer 
unnecessarily  yet  not  standing  for  this  by  continuing  to  consume  factory-farmed 
meat/eggs/dairy/seafood  revealed  a  lack  of  integrity,  and  so  we  ought  not  consume  them.  I  called 
this  the  Argument  from  Integrity.  
Since  collective  action  cases  take  one  of  two  forms,  and  for  both  forms  there  is  an 
argument  to  be  made  that,  even  if  our  actions  to  not  make  a  difference,  we  still  have  reason  to 
act,  I  can  say  that,  in  general  and  as  a  whole,  we  have  reasons  not  to  consume  animal  products 
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